I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. R. Enterprises I the United States Supreme Court held that a subpoena duces tecum 2 issued by a grand jury is presumed to be reasonable and that the recipient bears the burden of proving unreasonableness. 3 The Court stressed the importance of grand jury independence while making it more difficult for a recipient to quash a subpoena. 4 This Note explores the Court's opinion and concludes that the Court correctly placed the burden of proving unreasonableness on the subpoena recipient but inadequately defined the scope of the reasonableness standard. 5 As a result lower courts may not know when to employ the Court's standard of reasonableness. This Note attempts to clarify these ambiguities by predicting how courts will apply and interpret the Court's standard. 6 This Note also questions the Court's reliance on the independent investigatory nature of the grand jury in light of recent changes in the grand jury system. 7 Finally, this Note praises Justice Stevens' standard for balancing both sides' interests while considering how the grand jury presently operates.
In Branzburg v. Hayes 21 the Court faced a First Amendment challenge to a subpoena which required newspersons to testify and divulge confidential sources to a grandjury. 2 2 The Court required the Government to establish that the information sought in a grand jury investigation related "directly" to the criminal conduct being investigated. 23 The Court recognized that when a grand jury subpoena infringes upon First Amendment interests, the government's burden of proof increases. 2 4 In the present case, the Court required the government to show a direct link between the newsperson's testimony about confidential sources and the investigation into drug trafficking. 25 The Court upheld the subpoena, finding that eradicating illegal drug trafficking constituted a "compelling state interest" and that the information pertaining to a drug transaction directly related to the grand jury investigation. 2 6 In so finding the Court stressed, " [i] t is only after the grand jury has examined the evidence that a determination of whether the proceeding will result in an indictment can be made." 2 7 In United States v. Dionisio 28 the Court held that in general the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable search and seizure does not apply to grand jury subpoenas. 29 Citing Hale, the Court noted however, that the Fourth Amendment does, "provide protection against a grand jury subpoena duces tecum too sweeping in its terms 'to be regarded as reasonable.' "30 The Court rejected the argument that the Fourth Amendment required the government "all understandings, contracts or correspondence between the MacAndrews & Forbes Company, and no less than six different companies, as well as all reports made, and accounts rendered by such companies from the date of the organization of the MacAndrews & Forbes Company, as well as all letters received by that company since its organization from more than a dozen different companies situated in seven different states .. Id. 21 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 22 Id. at 667. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. 23 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 708. 24 Id. at 700-701 (quoting Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963)). The "compelling interest" rule is based upon a line of cases that require official action with adverse impact on First Amendment rights be justified by a "compelling" public interest. See id. at 680 n.18. 44 The Court held that the Government must show the relevancy, admissibility, and specificity of the subpoenaed materials before a court will enforce a subpoena duces tecum pursuant to Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 4 5 In the absence of such a showing the subpoena will be considered "unreasonable or oppressive. ' '46 Nixon argued that due to his executive privilege the subpoena failed to meet Rule 17(c)'s reasonableness requirement. 47 The Court found that the prosecutor had made a sufficient showing to justify the subpoena.
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B. STANDARDS EMPLOYED BY LOWER COURTS
Reasonableness Requirement
In determining whether a grand jury subpoena duces tecum is reasonable pursuant to Dionisio, 4 9 lower courts have used a three component test: 5 0
(1) the subpoena may command only the production of things relevant to the investigation being pursued; (2) specification of things tobe produced must be made with reasonable particularity; and (3) production of records covering only a reasonable period of time may be required. To balance the effect of the three part test, courts give the Government considerable deference on the relevancy issue because of the grand jury's exploratory nature. 5 1 Consequently, the Government has been required to prove the elements of the following three-part test in order to maintain its burden of proving relevancy. "1. That there is a pending grand jury investigation; and 2. The general nature of the subject matter of said grand jury investigation; and 3. That some possible relationship exists between the subpoenaed documents and the subject matter of said investigation. ' 52 This three part reasonableness test is distinct from the Nixon test 55 in one important way. The Nixon test requires the Government to show the admissibility of subpoenaed materials at trial. No such requirement is found in the reasonableness standard for an overly broad grand jury subpoena.
Relevancy Objections
The lower courts apply conflicting standards when reviewing relevancy objections to grand jury subpoenas. The courts are also in disagreement as to whether the Government or the subpoena recipient bears the burden of proof. Some courts require a preliminary showing of relevancy by the government. 5 4 Other courts place a strong burden on the recipient to prove that the subpoenaed materials are irrelevant. 55 Yet a third group of courts place a lesser burden on the recipient.
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grounds, "the burden is on the party seeking to quash the subpoena to show 'that the information sought bears no conceivable relevance to any legitimate object of investigation by the federal grand jury.' "58 Similarly, in In re Liberatore, 5 9 the Second Circuit employed the same "no conceivable relevance" standard to a grand jury subpoena recipient's relevancy objection. 60 The court held that the "[G]overnment does not in each and every case bear the constant burden of initially showing the relevance of the particular evidence sought to be produced by way of subpoena." 6 1
In contrast to the "no conceivable relevance" standard, the Third and Tenth Circuits have required the Government to make a preliminary showing of relevance. 6 2 In Schofield 163 the Third Circuit held that the "Government [would] be required to make some preliminary showing by affidavit that each item [sought] is at least relevant to an investigation being conducted by the grand jury and properly within its jurisdiction, and is not sought primarily for another purpose." 64 The Third Circuit has since softened the Government's affidavit burden by only requiring the Government to show that the documents requested are reasonably related to the subject of the grand jury's investigation. Forging a middle ground, the Eleventh and Ninth circuits do not require a preliminary showing of relevance by the Government and do not hold the recipient to the stringent "no conceivable relevance" standard. 6 6 In In re grand Jury Proceedings (Bank of Nova Scotia) 6 7 the Eleventh Circuit refused to require the Government to show that the documents sought were relevant to the grand jury investigation, "absent some showing of harassment or prosecutorial misuse of the system." ' 68 58 Id. at 330 (quoting In re Libertore, 574 F.2d at 83). The recipient, a former union official, sought to quash a subpoena seeking all books, papers, records, and data relating to certain discretionary bank accounts controlled by him. The court of appeals rejected the official's contention that the Government should have the burden of demonstrating the relevance of the requested materials.
59 574 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1978) . 60 Id The recipient of a grand jury subpoena seeking handwriting exemplars contended that the Government should be required to show relevance and necessity of the information to the grand jury's investigation.
The Ninth Circuit, in In re Grand Jury Proceeding (Schofield) 69, also refused to impose on the Government the burden to make a threshold showing of relevance. In Schofield the grand jury issued a subpoena to the former attorney of a target, requesting documents relating to the previous representation. The district court quashed the subpoena explaining that the Government must first establish by affidavit, the "legitimate need and relevance" of the requested materials. 70 The court of appeals reversed, holding that "[n]o affidavit of relevance and need must be introduced" because the presumption is that the Government obeys the law. The parties maintained that R. Enterprises and MFR sold only to local customers and never conducted business in Virginia. 0 Therefore, their records were irrelevant to an investigation pertaining to the shipment of obscene materials into Virginia.
Additionally, the parties maintained that the burden on these small companies to comply with the subpoenas would severely impact the distribution of books in violation of the First Amendment. 8 1 Even though corporate records and not magazines were subpoenaed, the First Amendment still afforded protection. 8 2 Accordingly, the parties argued that the Government must show a compelling state need for the business records sought and that the records were substantially related to the grand jury's investigation. 3 The petitioner admitted that this heightened standard is limited to cases where the challenged subpoena arguably violates the First Amendment. The compelling interest standard leaves substantial discretion with the district court to balance the competing interests of the First Amendment and the Government's right to investigate potential crimes. The parties argued that because the subpoenaed materials were irrelevant to the investigation, the interest of the First Amendment greatly outweighed the Government's right to investigate. Therefore, because the subpoenas violated the First Amendment and were irrelevant to the investigation, they were unreasonable under Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied the petitioner's motion to quash the subpoenas. 8 5 Additionally, the district court held that production of the videotapes did not consti- tute a prior restraint. 8 6 The district court found that because R. Enterprises, MFR, and Model were owned by the same person, a sufficient connection with Virginia existed to satisfy the subpoenas' relevancy to the grand jury investigation. 8 7 In response to plaintiffs' arguments that the Government needs to show a substantial relation between the subpoenaed materials and the investigation, the district court felt "inclined to agree" with "the majority of jurisdictions" 8 8
which do not require the Government to make a "threshold showing" before a grand jury subpoena will be enforced. 8 9 In sum, the district court characterized the subpoenas as "fairly standard business subpoenas" that "ought to be complied with." 90 The district court struck down the First Amendment issue by finding that business records are not protected by the First Amendment. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the subpoena for Model's business records but remanded the motion to quash the subpoena for Model's videotapes. 9 1 In addition, the court of appeals overturned the district court's denial of the motion to quash the business records subpoenas issued to R. Enterprises and MFR. 92 The court of appeals applied the Nixon standard without explanation. 93 Possibly, they may have reasoned that since the governing rule for a subpoena duces tecum in both the grand jury and trial context is found in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c), the Nixon standard should be equally applicable to a grand jury subpoena. Following the Nixon standard the court of appeals required the government to "clear three hurdles" before it enforced the grand jury subpoenas: (1) relevancy; (2) admissibility; (3) specificity.
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The court of appeals found that the Government met its relevancy burden of proof with Model's business records because of the evidence that Model had shipped obscene materials into the Eastern District of Virginia. 9 5 Because the Government did not know that every videotape subpoenaed contained obscene materials, the court of appeals remanded for the district court to determine in camera if the videotapes contain obscene materials. 9 6 This precaution was necessary because the First Amendment protects from being subpoenaed any videotape that is not obscene. The R. Enterprises and MFR subpoenas failed to meet the Nixon standard that required the material to be admissible at trial, because there was no evidence that either company conducted business in the Eastern District of Virginia. 97 The Government's argument that all three companies were owned by the same person was not sufficient to meet the standard of proof. 98 The court of appeals did not rule on the First Amendment issue because the subpoenas did not pass the standard for ordinary subpoenaed materials as set out in Rule 17(c).
The United States appealed the decision quashing R. Enterprises' and MFR's subpoenas to the Supreme Court. The United States argued that the court of appeals applied the wrong standard for a grand jury subpoena and incorrectly placed the initial burden of proof on the government. 9 9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the conflicting standards employed by the lower courts to determine the reasonableness of a grand jury subpoena.
IV. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the Court, 1 0 0 Justice O'Connor reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for judgment on the First Amendment issue. 10 ' In so holding, the Court greatly expanded the Grand Jury's subpoena power by placing the burden of proof for relevancy objections on the recipient.' 0 2 Specifically, the majority held that when a recipient challenges a grand jury subpoena on relevancy grounds, the recipient bears the burden of showing "that there is no reasonable possibility that the category of materials the Government seeks will produce information relevant 96 Id. at 778-79. The court of appeals suggested that the Government take an easier route and buy the videotapes to check them for obscene scenes.
97 Id. at 776-77. 98 Id. to the general subject of the grand jury's investigation."'1 0 3 Under this standard the burden of proof lies solely with the subpoena recipient and the Government is under no obligation to make a threshold showing of relevance.104 In reaching its standard the Court criticized the court of appeals' adoption of the Nixon standard and held that the Nixon standard does not apply to grand jury subpoenas.' 0 5 Finally, the Court found that Respondents had not met their burden of proof in showing that the subpoenaed business records were irrelevant to the grand jury investigation.' 0 6
Application of Court's Standard to the Facts
Applying this standard to the case at bar, the Court required the Respondents to show that there was "no reasonable possibility" that their subpoenaed business records would produce "any relevant information" to the grand jury's investigation into allegations that obscene materials were shipped into the Eastern District of Virginia.' 0 7 Respondents maintained that neither of their companies had any connection with Virginia. 108 According to the Court, however, a blanket denial did not fulfill Respondent's burden of proof. 1 0 9 It was already known that Model had shipped obscene materials into Virginia."1 0 Because Respondents conduct the same business in the same area and are owned by the same person as Model, there existed a reasonable possibility that the business records were relevant. I I ' Therefore, the Court ruled that on its relevancy challenge, the Respondents had not fulfilled their burden to quash the subpoenas.
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The Court did not consider the First Amendment issue in the application of its standard to the facts of the case. According to the Court, "[t]he Court of Appeals determined that the subpoenas did not satisfy Rule 17(c) and thus did not pass on the First Amendment issue. We express no view on this issue and leave it to be resolved by the Court of Appeals."" [Vol. 82
SUBPOENA REASONABLENESS
Rationale for Rejecting the Nixon Standard
The Court declined to extend the Nixon standard for reviewing the reasonableness of a trial subpoena to a grand jury subpoena.
4
In Nixon"1 5 the Court found a trial subpoena was unreasonable under Rule 17(c) if the prosecutor did not show the relevancy, admissibility, and specificity of the subpoenaed materials to the trial." 1 6 In addition, Nixon placed the standard of proof on the government to show that the subpoena is reasonable."1 7 In rejecting the Nixon standard, two propositions were made. First, the nature of a grand jury investigation is unique and distinct from that of a criminal trial.1 Second, restrictions such as the Nixon standard, that would delay a grand jury investigation, are not applicable." 9 In support of the first proposition, the Court emphasized that the grand jury operates in a distinct fashion from a trial court. 20 First, while a court is limited to a specific case and charge, a grand jury "can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not." 1 21 Furthermore, in performing the necessary function of gathering all information that might possibly concern the investigation, a grand jury must paint with a broad brush. A grand jury needs to investigate every clue to determine whether a crime has been committed. 2 2 Finally, at a criminal trial the specific offense and defendant are known at the outset, while in a grand jury investigation, if there be an offense and defendant, they are not developed until the investigation's conclusion.
the Court refused to apply the rule against hearsay to a grand jury investigation. The Court stated probable delay in the grand jury process as a rationale for their decision. 12 5 In addition, the Court held in United States v. Calandra 1 26 that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule did not apply to grand jury proceedings: "A grand jury 'may compel the production of evidence or testimony of witnesses as it considers appropriate, and its operation generally is unrestrained by the technical procedural and evidentiary rules governing the conduct of criminal trials.' "127
In furtherance of its contention that the Nixon standards were not appropriate for a grand jury, the Court cited to its statement in United States v. Dionisio, 1 28 that, "[a]ny holding that would saddle a grand jury with minitrials and preliminary showings would assuredly impede its investigation and frustrate the public's interest in the fair and expeditious administration of the criminal laws."' 29 Therefore, because the Nixon standard "would invite procedural delays and detours while courts evaluate the relevancy and admissibility of documents sought by a particular subpoena,"' 1 3 0 it is inapplicable in the grand jury context.
New Rule 17(c) Reasonableness Standard for Grand Jury Subpoenas
With respect to future cases, the Court clarified the standard to evaluate reasonableness under Rule 17(c) and where to place the burden, thus resolving the split in the circuits. 13 1 First, because the Court presumed a grand jury acts within its scope of authority, the Court placed the burden of showing unreasonableness on the subpoena recipient. 13 2 Second, the Court concluded that when a recipient challenges a subpoena on relevancy grounds, 3 3 "the motion to come tax evasion, contended that his indictment by the grand jury relied on hearsay evidence). 125 Id. at 364. 126 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (witness summoned to appear and testify before a grand jury refused to answer questions that were based on evidence obtained from unlawful search and seizure; Court held that witness must answer questions because Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to grand jury proceedings 
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quash must be denied unless the district court determines that there is no reasonable possibility that the category of materials the Government seeks will produce information relevant to the general subject of the grand jury's investigation."' 1 3
4 The Court expressed concern for those subpoena recipients who have no knowledge of the grand jury investigation but left it to the district courts to fashion appropriate procedures.' 3 5
B. CONCURRING OPINION
Justice Stevens disagreed with the reasonableness standard set by the Court. He faulted the Court's standard for only focusing on the relevance side of the balance while ignoring the burden a subpoena places on a recipient.' 3 6 According to Justice Stevens, the moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating to the court some valid objection to compliance.' 3 7 This objection may be made not on relevancy grounds but on various other grounds such as invasion of privacy. 138 After the moving party has made this initial showing, the trial court would then inquire into the relevance of the subpoenaed materials. In this inquiry, "the degree of need sufficient to justify denial of the motion to quash will vary to some extent with the burden of producing the requested information."' ' 3 9
Applying this standard to the present case, the Respondents fulfilled their burden of demonstrating a valid objection by arguing the First Amendment implications involved with compliance.' 4 0
The trial court then should inquire into the relevancy of Respondents' business records, taking into account the First Amendment implications.
1 4 ' In addition, Justice Stevens would have the district court consider the history of this particular grand jury investigation.' 4 2 In the present case, the district court would, thus consider the numerous subpoenas received by Model before the present subpoena. 143 Justice Stevens did not indicate how he would hold in the reasonableness limitation imposed on grand jury subpoenas by Rule 17(c), and then, without explanation, seemingly limited the definition to challenges on relevancy grounds; See infra text accompanying notes 146-47 for further discussion.
134 R. Enterprises, 111 S. Ct. at 728.
present case under this analysis. Presumably, the lower court needs to undertake additional fact finding before a decision can be reached.
V. ANALYSIS
In R. Enterprises, the Supreme Court expanded the Court's deferential treatment of the grand jury by placing on the recipient of a subpoena duces tecum the burden of showing that the subpoena is unreasonable. 14 4 In fashioning a new definition of Rule 17(c)'s "unreasonable or oppressive" language, the Court was unclear as to the new standard's scope. It clearly applies to relevancy objections under Rule 17(c), yet it is unclear whether it applies to all objections under Rule 17(c). Additionally, support exists for the proposition that a grand jury acts as an arm of the executive and consequently, courts should not expand a grand jury's power.
14 5 As a result of these considerations, this Note predicts that lower courts may look to Justice Stevens' standard as a guide for reviewing objections to grand jury subpoenas.
A. AMBIGUITY IN JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S OPINION
The Court was unclear as to whether its standard applies for all objections to a grand jury subpoena duces tecum under Rule 17(c) or is limited to relevancy objections. In setting out its reasonableness standard, the Court stated that, "[t]o the extent that Rule 17(c) imposes some reasonableness limitation on grand jury subpoenas, however, our task is to define it."146 One then would expect the Court to create a standard that applies generally to unreasonable subpoenas. However, before announcing the standard, the Court stated, ". . . we conclude that where, as here, a subpoena is challenged on relevancy grounds ..... 147 thus leaving lower courts unsure as to whether this new standard applies to all subpoena challenges under Rule 17(c), or only to relevancy objections. This Note therefore predicts that district courts will use Justice Stevens' standard when a burden to comply with the subpoena exists independent of the subpoena's relevance.
Additionally, Justice O'Connor's standard does not allow lower courts to consider the unique circumstances of each case because it requires the recipient to prove the complete irrelevancy of every 144 See supra text accompanying notes 131-35.
145 See infra text accompanying notes 150-62. 146 R. Enterprises, 11 S. Ct. at 727. 147 Id. at 728. item in the subpoena. Using this standard, lower courts cannot consider prosecutorial abuse of the subpoena power. To show the complete irrelevancy of a subpoena a recipient must know all the prosecution's theories. It is practically impossible for the recipient to know every angle of the investigation and courts will not make the Government reveal this information because that would destroy the secrecy of the investigation. Therefore, lower courts will need to employ a different standard when they are confronted with a valid objection to compliance with a grand jury subpoena.
If relevancy is the only objection, courts will use Justice O'Connor's standard due to the grand jury's exploratory nature. When other factors are involved, courts will give less deference to the grand jury and will want to use a standard that considers all the implications involved. Justice Stevens' standard gives district courts guidelines to consider all the factors. To determine if a subpoena is unreasonable courts should ". . . take into account the entire history of this grand jury investigation, including the series of subpoenas that have been issued to the same corporations and their affiliates during the past several years .... ,"48
It is difficult to forecast a unified standard by which all courts will judge the reasonableness of a grand jury subpoena duces tecum. R. Enterprises has made clear that district courts will no longer place the burden on the government to make a preliminary showing of reasonableness. This holding is correct since the burden of proof lies on the party asserting the affirmative of a proposition. 49 In addition, a unanimous Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's analysis that the reasonableness standard for a grand jury subpoena is the same as the standard used for a trial subpoena.
B. HAS THE GRAND JURY'S INVESTIGATIVE ROLE CHANGED?
"guardian of the people. He further contended that witnesses summoned to testify before a grand jury are essentially brought to the prosecutor's room.
153
In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield) 154, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals described the grand jury as an investigative and prosecutorial arm of the government's executive branch. 155 The prosecutor yields most of the power vis a vis the grand jury. The investigatory powers granted to the grand jury are used by the prosecutor in building the case for the government. The prosecutor together with the police decides which witnesses to call. The prosecutor examines the witnesses and by his or her actions persuades the grand jury what to decide. 15 6 It is natural that part time grand jurors will look to the "professional" prosecutor for guidance.'
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If the grand jury acts much as the prosecutor's puppets, their broad investigatory powers in fact are granted directly to the prosecutor. 158 This may be a good idea since the prosecutor is more knowledgeable in how to run a criminal investigation. But the prosecutor's power which is an extension of police power, should then be subject to supervision and restrictions imposed by the courts. R. Enterprises continued in the line of Supreme Court cases that still view the grand jury in its historical independent role. Thus, the Court still refused to recognize that they are in essence increasing the prosecutor's powers when they protect the grand jury's broad investigatory powers. This misconception by the Court is unfortunate since the prosecutor's power should be subject to Fourth Amendment and other supervisory restrictions.
Considering the practical changes in how the grand jury operates, the Court's standard of reasonableness places too great a burden on the subpoena recipient while overemphasizing the ments against the grand jury see, WAYNE R. LAFAvE 60 The Court admitted that a subpoenaed party that does not know the general subject matter of the grand jury investigation will not be able to prove the Court's standard.' 6 ' The Court was confident that district courts would fashion a solution to this problem.' 6 2 But this standard would still be impossible to prove unless the entire investigation was explained to the recipient. Understandably courts would never require this. Therefore, a more balanced standard is necessary.
C. JUSTICE STEVENS' STANDARD IS MORE BALANCED
Justice Stevens' standard balances both sides' interests while considering the grand jury's present nature. In his standard "the degree of need sufficient to justify the denial of the motion to quash will vary to some extent with the burden of producing the requested information."' 163 This inquiry into the relevancy of the subpoenaed materials would only be made after the recipient had first demonstrated to the court some valid objection to compliance. 164 Such an objection may be that compliance has First Amendment implications. In this manner the government's interests of avoiding minitrials on peripheral matters and preserving a necessary level of secrecy would be protected since an inquiry would only be made after a recipient has already shown a valid objection. In addition, the recipient can seek a remedy for prosecutorial misuse of the subpoena power. The final governmental interest of affording grand juries wide latitude would be taken into account by the district court when ruling on relevancy.
Unlike the Court's standard which appeared so highly deferential that a recipient would never be able to show irrelevancy, Justice Stevens' standard would also consider the intrusiveness of the sub- 159 The Court concluded that a subpoena is reasonable unless there is "no reasonable possibility that the category of materials the Government seeks will produce information relevant to the general subject of the grand jury's investigation." United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 722, 728 (1991). 160 
Id
161
Id. 162 Id. 163 Id. at 730. (Stevens, J., concurring) . 164 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) .
poena. This is in part due to occasional prosecutorial misuse. In applying this standard, Justice Stevens suggested that the district court should consider the history of the specific grand jury investigation including past subpoenas. While most grand jury subpoenas will still be upheld because of deference given by the courts, this standard will allow those subpoenas that are intrusive and irrelevant to be quashed. This standard protects a recipient from an overzealous prosecutor. In sum, Justice Stevens' standard safeguards against prosecutorial misuse of the grand jury system while allowing the government to efficiently and fairly investigate possible crimes.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision rejecting the use of the Nixon standard when reviewing a grand jury subpoena duces tecum expanded the deference given to the grand jury. In reaching its decision the Court relied on case law supporting the independent investigatory powers of the grand jury.
The Court, in reaching a new definition of reasonableness, correctly placed the burden of proving unreasonableness on the subpoena recipient. By doing this, the Court rejected the practice of circuit courts that require a preliminary showing of relevancy by the Government. This holding agrees with the principle that the moving party bears the burden of proof.
The Court was unclear as to which objections its standard of reasonableness should be applied. If it was only meant for relevancy objections then the standard would achieve the Court's goal of quickly setting aside frivolous claims. If the standard was meant to apply to all objections under Rule 17(c) then it places an unfair burden on a recipient who may have a legitimate objection to compliance. Because of this ambiguity lower courts may alternate between employing the Court's standard andJustice Stevens' standard depending upon the particular objection to compliance.
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